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Philosophy and Ethical Consumption 
 





This chapter introduces some basic philosophical approaches that are useful in 
understanding and evaluating ethical consumption issues and ethical consumer 
behaviour. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section introduces the 
two main approaches to ethics in moral philosophy, ‘consequentialism’ and 
‘deontology’, and considers how appropriate they are when applied to questions of 
consumption. The example of consumer responses to products made using child 
labour is then explored to show how these two different approaches to ethics can lead 
to different outcomes. 
 
The second section considers the relevance of another approach, virtue ethics, which 
it is argued has the advantage of focussing on the broad contexts in which ethical 
issues arise. Virtue philosophy focuses on flourishing, and living a good life. 
Empirical evidence suggests that a sense of integrity is more fundamental to the well-
being of ethical consumers than either a concern for consequences or rules (though 
both of these are evident). 
 
In the third section we discuss the distinction between ethical consumption and the 
ethics of consumption. The former tends to see consumption as a means through 
which to express one’s moral commitments and the latter tends to be critical of the 
whole panoply of modern consumerism.  We also look at work which has focussed on 
the extent to which all consumers unconsciously consider moral issues in purchasing 
decisions. 
 
In the conclusion we argue that the future lies in facilitating more widespread public 
participation in debates about the meaning and purpose of ethical consumption itself. 
 
 
RULES, CONSEQUENCES AND THE ETHICS OF 
CONSUMPTION 
Moral philosophy often divides ethical theories into two sorts: theories that privilege 
the right, and theories that privilege the good. Definitions of the good refer to the 
properties or outcomes that our actions should endeavour to bring about; definitions 
of the right refer to what people and organizations ought to do in responding to ethical 
imperatives. Theories of the good therefore focus upon what outcomes to promote, 
whereas theories of the right focus upon what principles to honour, or on questions of 
duty (Pettit 1991, 237). Discussions of moral philosophy inevitably distinguish 
between these two broad positions, if only for heuristic purposes  
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Calculating consequences 
Theories which privilege questions of the good are often referred to as 
consequentialist - they are concerned with defining ethical conduct by reference to the 
consequences or outcomes of actions. These approaches are also sometimes called 
teleological, because they start by specifying an end (or ‘telos’) independently of 
moral obligations. They then define the right thing to do as acting to maximize the 
good. For example, utilitarianism advocates practices that maximize the overall sum 
happiness.  
 
Peter Singer is an important contemporary philosopher who has employed 
consequentialist arguments. He is well known for his advocacy of animal welfare. 
Singer is opposed to the other main approach to moral philosophy – the deontological 
approach – because he thinks it defines ethics narrowly in terms of a system of rules. 
Singer argues that consequentialist approaches are more practical and realistic, in so 
far as starting with goals means that judgements of actions will always depend on 
contextual factors. Singer’s animal welfare advocacy leads him to condemn most 
consumer uses of animals, including meat-eating and wearing fur or leather. He 
advocates an environmental ethics which holds that we should, as far as possible, act 
to avoid unnecessary harm to the environment and sentient creatures (Singer 1997, 
284-288). In a recent book, he argues that wealthy westerners should forego frivolous 
consumption that adds little to our lives, and devote the resources saved to helping the 
world’s poor (Singer 2002, 180-195). For Singer, all this implies that we should adopt 
an ethic of frugality and simplicity. High levels of consumption are a major problem 
in modern societies, an unjustified “using up the world” (Singer 1997, 45-64), and a 
foolish misallocation of resources. Consumption, from this perspective, is associated 
with the conspicuous and extravagant display of social position (ibid., 238-9).   
Singer’s arguments are more complex than this brief summary suggests, but they 
provide a one influential template for understanding the relationship between ethics 
and consumption. In particular, his argument that there is no good reason to restrict 
the scope of concern to our nearest and dearest, or indeed only to other people, seems 
highly appropriate to the field of ethical consumption, in which the fact of being one 
link in a much wider chain of relationships with strangers in distant locations is often 
made the basis of appeals to alter one’s consumer behaviour in order to bring about 
more ‘ethical’ outcomes.  
Ethical consumption campaigns and policies often rely on consequentialist 
assumptions and appeals. They tend to assume that ethical decision-making works 
through the rational calculation of ethical obligations, for which the provision of 
knowledge, advice, and information is an essential prerequisite. Existing research on 
consumption therefore often depends on relatively narrow conceptualisations of 
ethical decision-making by consumers, companies, and public organisations. In 
particular, ethical consumption is understood in both theory and practice to depend on 
access to information. This leaves aside the questions of how the goals considered 
worthy of pursuit through consumption are decided upon, and by whom. It also seems 
to imply that there is a single measure of what ‘the good’ is, and of what ‘acting 
ethically’ should entail, and that the main challenge is to get consumers to adopt the 
appropriate forms of conduct and behaviour  
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Obeying universal rules 
In contrast to consequentialist approaches, deontological or duty-based approaches 
define right action independently of its contribution to human happiness or other 
favoured goals. Deontological moral theories have gone through a revival since the 
publication of John Rawls’ (1972) A Theory of Justice. Rawls explicitly set about 
developing an alternative approach to utilitarian theories of ethics and justice. He 
argued that teleological theories implied that it is justifiable to exploit some people, or 
limit their rights, in pursuit of a more general utilitarian benefit. Utilitarian theories 
did not “take seriously the distinction between persons”, tending to assume that 
collective choices of whole societies were analogous to individual choices. They 
therefore ignored what Rawls takes to be an inevitable plurality of views as to what 
constitutes the good. The plurality of values led Rawls to defend the priority of the 
right over the good, as a means of ensuring that definitions of the collective good do 
not come at the cost of basic individual liberties. Rawls’ work is important because it 
highlights the tension between the plurality of personal values and ethical positions on 
the one hand, and the degree of unity required to pursue collective outcomes and 
decisions on the other. 
Ethical consumption discourses also contain elements of deontological understandings 
of moral obligation. They often invoke highly universalized arguments about people’s 
responsibilities to care for others – whether this is other people, other creatures, the 
environment, or future generations, as in the Precautionary Principle. Ethicists who 
have written about the ethics of global warming, for example, tend to argue along the 
following lines: (1) Current energy consumption patterns are warming the earth, with 
unknown but potentially disastrous consequences for human life support systems; (2) 
current humans have a duty to future generations to pass on fully functioning life 
support systems; therefore (3) current humans have a duty to significantly scale back 
our energy consumption (Brown 2002).  
It should also be noted that the concepts of human rights and workers’ rights which 
are central to many ethical consumer campaigns, draw strongly on the deontological 
approach. 
 
The limitations of universal prescriptions 
Both consequentialist and deontological approaches are open to two related criticisms 
that are relevant to ethical consumption. Firstly, both present models of ethical 
conduct that appear to be far too stringent in the demands they make on the capacities 
of ordinary people – consequentialist arguments seem to imagine it is possible to 
collect, collate and calculate all sorts of information and chains of causality prior to, 
or even after, action. While utilitarian considerations might be relevant in relation to 
evaluating collective, public decisions, they seem rather unrealistic as complete 
models of personal choice. Similarly, deontological approaches seem to present an 
implausible picture of actors rationally judging the degree to which each of their 
actions conforms to a very abstract principle of universalization. This criticism – of 
over stringent or unworkable models of ethical conduct - is related to a second 
problem with both consequentialist and deontological approaches. They end up 
presenting models of ethical conduct that are highly abstract and inflexible – they 
seem not to leave room for the complexities and ambivalences of ethical decision 
making, and in turn, they therefore present a highly abstracted model of the ways in 
which people are implicated and involved in their actions.  
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To illustrate the relevance of these concerns to how we approach ethical 
consumption, consider a couple of examples. Firstly, there is the case of sustainable 
consumption initiatives, which have become increasingly important in the wake of 
international programmes such as Local Agenda 21. As Hobson (2002, 2003) 
observes, the assumption of many of these initiatives is that the exposure of the public 
to scientific knowledge will trigger changes in consumer behaviour. However, this 
assumption takes no account of the myriad ways in which consumer goods play 
important symbolic roles in the ordinary lives of people. As Jackson (2003) observes, 
material products do more than simply provide basic needs – they also serve to 
facilitate interpersonal interactions, senses of personal identity and worth, or as means 
of creativity. To use the vocabulary developed by Amartya Sen and Martha 
Nussbaum, the value of material consumer goods needs to be understood in terms of 
the ‘functionings’ and ‘capabilities’ they enable people to develop. Jackson’s 
argument is that this tendency for sustainable consumption policies to ignore social 
aspects of consumption  accounts for the difficulty of altering consumer behaviour. 
Simplistic appeals to reduce or forego consumption are “tantamount to demanding 
that we give up certain key capabilities and freedoms as social beings” (Jackson 2003, 
9). The implication of this argument is that ethical consumption cannot depend solely 
on either consequentialist or deontological approaches, because these fail to register 
the motivations behind a great deal of consumer behaviour. What may be required, 
then, is an approach that is more sensitive to the experiential horizons of ordinary 
consumers, and in particular to the ways in which particular sorts of ethical conduct is 
already embedded in everyday consumption practice.   
 
A second example of the limitations of abstract models of moral responsibility is the 
recent emergence of concerted anti-sweatshop campaigns in the United States, 
especially on University campuses. It is common to think of boycott campaigns in 
terms of bringing to view the connections between the consumption of particular 
products, such as Nike sportswear for example, and the oppressive or exploitative 
working conditions in which these are made. It would be easy to think of these sorts 
of campaigns in consequentialist terms. They aim at changing individual or collective 
conduct by providing knowledge of spatially distant contexts and empowering 
individuals to accept their responsibilities. Consequentialist responsibility is 
understood to depend on a clear calculation of the relations between our voluntary 
actions and their consequences. However, the idea that ethical consumption can work 
simply by bringing to view the chain of consequences and connections between 
consumers and producers is highly simplistic. As Iris Young (2003) has argued, this 
notion of responsibility tends to elide important distinctions between being causally 
responsible for events, being a beneficiary, and being in a position to actually change 
outcomes. This model of responsibility ends up being overwhelming as well as highly 
unfair in its ascription of obligations to change things.  
Young argues that, in fact, anti-sweatshop campaigns are important because they 
have developed a non-individualised, political sense of responsibility that departs 
from a wholly individualistic understanding of causality, agency, and blame. The 
success of anti-sweatshop movements depends, she suggests, on campaigners and 
activists being able to provide frames in which consumers can acknowledge 
responsibility for distant contexts without being overwhelmed.  
Young (2003) implies that people are likely to be moved to changing their 
consumption behaviour by all sorts of different considerations. This is also the 
implication of empirical research on consumption boycotts, which suggests that these 
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are not forms of collective action, but that boycotters are motivated by personal 
factors such as the emotional expression of individuality, so that boycotting serves as 
a vehicle for moral self-realization (Kozinets and Handleman 1998). This is important 
because it suggests that ethical consumption is not simply a matter of wholly self-less 
beneficence, but that when successful, campaigns will combine appeals to both other-
regarding and self-regarding virtues. 
 
One problem, then, with a narrowly consequentialist understanding of moral 
reasoning is that by implying that we should act in a manner wholly oriented to 
collective outcomes, it ignores what acting morally actually means to people. As 
Derek Parfit points out (1984, 27), if we all acted as pure do-gooders, it might actually 
make things worse rather than not better. This is because being a pure do-gooder 
would involve so much self-sacrifice that it would decrease the overall sum of 
happiness. Parfit’s point is that being wholly self-less would involve acting against 
many of the motives that we act upon when we love others, care, show concern, and 
so on. The implication of this argument is that changing people’s consumption 
practices is probably  not best pursued by simply appealing to people’s sense of self-
sacrifice or altruism, nor by supposing that it requires a wholesale abandonment of 
self-interested concerns.  
We saw above that one advantage of consequentialism is that it is contextually 
sensitive, so that it does not hold that the value of a particular course of action is 
determined in advance by a set of rules. However, if this is one charge made against 
deontological approaches, the counter-argument is that consequentialism can, in 
principle, lead to an indifference to the righteousness of actions – to a privileging of 
ends over means Parfit (1984) . We might ask whether it matters if ethical 
consumption campaigns realise their aims and objectives by: a) actively altering 
people’s sense of what is the best thing to do, or; b) simply by more anonymous 
changes to consumption patterns. Is ethical consumption simply about aggregate 
outcomes – reduced pollution, less exploitative work conditions, etc – or is it also 
about actually changing the sense of self held by ordinary people? Many advocates of 
ethical consumption see the adoption of a more conscious approach to consumption as 
an important objective of their overall strategy. 
If neither pure consequentialist nor pure deontological approaches capture the 
complexity of moral action, perhaps it might be better not to abandon these 
approaches, but recast them in less all-or-nothing ways. Amartya Sen distinguishes 
between consequentialism and consequentialist reasoning. He suggests that 
consequentialism demands “that the rightness of actions be judged entirely by the 
goodness of consequences, and this is a demand not merely of taking consequences 
into account, but of ignoring everything else” (Sen 1987, 75). However, Sen suggests 
that it is possible to develop what he calls “consequence-sensitive deontological” 
arguments (1987, 76). This requires acknowledging that rights – the primary concern 
of deontologists – have both an instrumental and an intrinsic value. This means that 
deontology is itself not immune to consequentialist considerations: rights are not only 
valuable intrinsically, but also because of the goals they enable people to pursue. 
What all of this suggests is that it is more appropriate to think of any ethical theory as 
combining an understanding of the good with an understanding of the right in a 
distinctive way (Pettit 1991, 230).  
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Products made using child labour 
To illustrate some of the arguments made above about the complexity of ethical 
action, let us consider how consequentialism and deontology might be applied to the 
example of products made by child labour. Firstly, the deontologist might refuse to 
buy products made using child labour on principle, arguing that this violates a 
fundamental moral rule against the exploitation of children. After all, she would not 
wish her own children to labour, less still in exploitative conditions, and must 
universalise this rule. However, the dilemma arises when one is faced with the 
argument that the fate of children is worsened by her action – an important source of 
family income might be reduced (see Meiklejohn 1998). In contrast, on these grounds, 
the utilitarian might buy products made using child labour, since not to do so would 
cause more harm than good. She might also have a reasonable, but not certain, 
expectation that in the long-term trade conditions would improve. However, this 
consumer is still faced with the question of when she should withdraw support for 
iniquitous producer practices?  
Forms of consequentialist reasoning can therefore help us to consider our external 
environment and our effect on the happiness of others. However, we cannot ignore 
our own moral beliefs in considering these sorts of issues (Norman 1998). It is not a 
case of choosing between the happiness of the many and our own egoistic morals. Our 
own unhappiness as ethical consumers is not simply to be weighed in the generality of 
happiness. That we are concerned at all is because we are moral agents. Any capacity 
for moral agency is indivisible from the sense of personal integrity upon which it is 
partly based in the first place. We cannot entirely derive our notion of what is the 
ethical thing to do from an external consideration of effects on others, thereby 
ignoring our own intuitions of right and wrong.  
 
The deontologist and the consequentialist seem to make cold calculations of what it 
is right to do, based either on a calculation of the outcomes of buying products made 
by child labour, or by reference to a general rule against ever so doing. Neither 
approach gives adequate attention to what motivates people to be concerned by this 
question to begin with. This is the question that virtue theorists do address, and virtue 
ethics represents a third approach we consider in relation to ethical consumption. 
Virtue theorists are concerned with what we should do, but they relate this to the 
question of what kinds of people we should aim to be, and how this sort of 
consideration shapes our actions. So, faced with the concern about child labour, our 
consumer might be advised by a virtue theorist to be compassionate and generous. 
Clearly she should be concerned with the children’s plight, not shrink from paying 
more for a product if that is appropriate and not overly prioritise her own interest. A 
generous and compassionate mother might campaign to challenge entrenched 
interests. Nevertheless she would have to weigh these actions against the needs of her 
own children. The main focus of this approach, then, in our case, would be upon the 
cultivation of those dispositions that enable consumers to juggle what are often 
equally compelling ethical imperatives in a reasonable fashion. The ethical issues 
raised in “decisions concerning what, whether and how much to consume” (Cafaro 
2001), cannot be reduced to simple calculations of outcomes or rules, but require a 
more careful consideration of the complexities of ordinary ethical conduct in 
everyday life.  
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Summary: Restoring the social focus 
We have suggested that much of the focus of ethical consumption is on the individual. 
How and what individuals consume is critical to the project of ethical consumption 
and critical to their understanding of themselves. Both consequentialist and 
deontological forms of moral reasoning tend to focus on individual conduct. 
However, it is important to re-acknowledge that individuals consume within broader 
networks of social relations and cultural codes. This allows us to recognise that all 
consumer behaviour, however ordinary and routine, is likely to be shaped by diverse 
values of caring for other people and concern for fairness. The success of ethical 
consumption campaigns is likely to be enhanced if they connect up with these 
ordinary and routine values of care and concern that already subsist in everyday 
consumption, rather than setting off ‘ethical consumption’ as a completely different 
set of activities that requires a wholesale abandonment of self-concern. In the next 
section, with these thoughts in mind, we turn to consider the relevance of virtue 
ethics, which has the potential of re-focussing our attention on the whole context of 
social life in which questions of individual responsibility arise and are worked out.     
 
LIVING VIRTUOUSLY AND MOTIVATING ETHICAL 
CONSUMPTION 
Consequentialism and deontology do not exhaust the approaches to ethics that are 
relevant to ethical consumption. A third approach, virtue ethics, has become an 
increasingly important alternative in recent moral philosophy as an alternative to both 
outcome-oriented consequentialism and rule-based deontology (MacIntyre 1984, 
Swanton 2003). Virtue theories redefine the overarching question of ethical theory 
away from ‘What ought I do?’, to one of ‘What sort of person ought I strive to be?’. 
Virtue ethics makes new sorts of consumption arguments possible. Virtue theories 
concern themselves less with our duties toward others, and more with specifying 
personal excellence and societal flourishing, and the best ways to achieve them. While 
consequentialists and deontologists work to justify altruism against the obstacles of 
self-interest, virtue ethicists try to awaken us to our enlightened self-interest in caring 
for others.  While the former’s main question is: “What are my duties to others and 
their responsibilities to me?” the latter’s is: “What is the good life and how can we go 
about living it?” Virtue theories work to specify the character traits, or virtues, that 
lead to human flourishing (Hursthouse 1999, Foot 2001). Such virtues include justice, 
compassion, tolerance, courage, patience, persistence, intelligence, imagination and 
creativity. Virtue, on this approach, is a synonym for human excellence and goodness 
(Taylor 2002, Cafaro 2004).  
Virtue theory pays attention to the habits and practices through which virtues are 
learned. It is thus well placed to discuss which habits and practices  might lead us to 
act in ways that are, for example, more environmentally sustainable. Virtue ethics is 
appropriate to the analysis of ethical consumption because there is empirical evidence 
to suggest that ‘ethical consumers’ are motivated primarily by a sense of personal 
integrity. Kozinets and Handelman (1998) speak of “[boycott] actions that remind and 
connect the individual to their deeper moral self.” Similarly, respondents to recent 
research often expressed concern for the consequences of their consumption practices 
but more fundamentally a desire to respond to their choices with personal integrity 
(Newholm 2000; Shaw and Shiu 2003). Even if consumers rarely feel able to foresee 
the consequences of their choices, what they seemed sure of was that, as one 
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respondent put it, “I couldn't bare to do nothing” (Shaw and Newholm 2003). In this 
concern we see a merging of the self-interested and altruistic aspects of morality. 
From one perspective, virtue ethics allows us to clarify what the problem with 
consumption is, by asking the question whether consumption as an activity is virtuous 
or not. There is a long tradition of philosophers arguing that a life devoted to 
consumption is ignoble and limiting. Thus, Aristotle wrote in his Nicomachean 
Ethics: “The many, the most vulgar, would seem to conceive of the good and 
happiness as pleasure, and hence they also like the life of gratification. Here they 
appear completely slavish, since the life they decide on is a life for grazing animals” 
(Aristotle 1999, 8). This argument sees consumption as the satisfaction of pleasure, 
that is, as an essentially hedonistic practice. It is also assumed that consumption is 
essentially a passive process, and therefore it contravenes the imperative to actively 
develop one’s capacities upon which virtue theories put considerable emphasis.  On 
these grounds, too much emphasis on consumption could be seen to lead to a passive 
life that is ultimately unsatisfying.  
One problem with virtue ethics, however, is that it can easily lead to a paternalist 
and censorious judgement of the apparent vices of specific social groups. This risk 
follows from the idea that, as Phillipa Foot puts it, the virtues are “corrective”, that is, 
that the value of different virtues (such as courage, or temperance, or charity) emerges 
at “a point at which there is some temptation to be resisted or deficiency of motivation 
to be made good” (1978,8) For example, she continues, “it is only because fear and 
the desire for pleasure often operate as temptations that courage and temperance exist 
as virtues at all” (1978 9). The main point that follows from this observation is that 
any contemporary conceptualisation of virtue needs to be extremely sensitive to the 
underlying image of human life that determines where ‘temptations’ and ‘deficiencies 
of motivation’ are to be identified. The virtues must not simply reproduce a highly 
problematic superiority that covers over a whole set of class and gender stereotypes 
about which sorts of people are susceptible to a relative lack of proper virtue. As Foot 
observes, it is possible that “the theory of human nature lying behind the traditional 
list of the virtues and vices puts too much emphasis on hedonistic and sensual 
impulses” (1978, 10). This is a particularly telling point with respect to the application 
of virtue theory to issues of consumption. A virtue ethics approach could easily lead 
to an analysis that sees the main problem in terms of unchecked hedonism and desire 
for pleasure by selfish, unethical consumers. Such an analysis is likely to alienate the 
sorts of people with which ethical consumption campaigns most need to 
communicate.    
The critical question with respect to the relevance of virtue ethics to consumption 
issues is how to think of the relationship between individual actions, consumption, 
and broader conceptions of the good life. In this respect, in order to avoid  the 
paternalism noted above, it might be more fruitful to rethink what we understand 
consumption to be. Rather than thinking of consumption as a set of distinct practices 
(shopping, eating, and so on) set off from other activities, and carried on by a 
particular sort of social subject (the consumer), which may be more or less virtuous, it 
might be more fruitful to think of consumption as one aspect of any social practice. 
This is the approach suggested by the sociologist Alan Warde (2004). He defines 
consumption “as a process whereby agents engage in appropriation, whether for 
utilitarian, expressive or contemplative purposes, of goods, services, performances, 
information or ambience, whether purchased or not, over which the agent has some 
degree of discretion” (2004, 5). According to this definition, consumption is not 
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understood as a practice as such, but rather as “a moment in almost every practice” 
(2004, 6). This shift of emphasis onto the sorts of practices that people are engaged in 
is consistent with the value that virtue ethics places on thinking about the roles and 
activities in which people are involved. This practice-based conceptualisation of 
consumption maintains the emphasis on the roles through which people cultivate 
different dispositions towards the world and others, but understands these primarily in 
relation to the collective modes for organising the conduct of everyday life. It enables 
questions to be asked about the sorts of consumption-effects embedded in different 
practices to which people may feel more or less strongly committed (e.g. being a 
caring parent, being a loyal friend, being loyal supporter of a football team, and so 
on). And it opens up these questions in such as a way that makes it possible to 
differentiate between actors who may be differentially empowered to change these 
consumption effects – the key issue identified by Iris Young in developing a fully 
political sense of responsibility in relation to consumption practices. Being able to 
make these sorts of differentiations is crucial to developing an effective sense of the 
sorts of actors and the types of agency that are required to bring about changes in 
aggregate patterns of consumption.  
 
Partiality and impartiality in ethics  
One important distinction between virtue theory and both consequentialist and 
deontological approaches is that the latter two are both universalistic in their 
orientation – morality is understood according to notions of universal benevolence, or 
as acting in accord with principles that can be universalised to all others. In contrast, 
virtue theory does not argue that either universal benevolence or duty is the best 
motive for acting. Virtue theory tends to imply a version of partiality in ethics, in 
which caring for and acting to benefit some people more than others is morally 
acceptable. This seems to conflict with some basic principles of ethical consumption, 
which often calls for an extension of the scope of our concern beyond the confines of 
nearest and dearest, or compatriots, to distant others, to non-human animals, and to 
the environment. The key challenge presented by virtue ethics, then, is that of finding 
ways of combining intimate caring for particular others with humanitarian caring 
about others in general (Slote 2000, 337-339). The moral concerns that motivate love, 
or caring, cannot simply be extended or aggregated across all contexts without 
undermining the very value of those virtues. Rather than assuming that this justifies 
according lesser priority to general or universal principles of moral action, we might 
instead interpret the qualified defence of partiality in virtue ethics as raising the 
question of how to develop forms of practice which can successfully connect both 
partial and universalistic motivations. So for example, it might lead us to 
acknowledge that concerns over the ethics of food production – evident in campaigns 
around GM foods, the use of pesticides, the BSE crisis, and the growth of organic 
food production – are not simply motivated by abstract concerns for ‘the 
environment’ or for ‘future generations’, but are intimately bound up with the forms 
of care and concern that shape everyday social relations of domestic family life. They 
are manifest, for example, in a concern over the long-term health risks of the food that 
parents provide for their kids. While clearly a partial concern on the one hand, this 
type of care for others can lead to ways of living that are beneficial for all if it leads to 
changes in consumer activity on a sufficient scale. 
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This observation underscores the importance of taking account of the concerns that 
motivate ordinary consumption practices. Rather than thinking of ‘ethical 
consumption’ being set-off against ‘unethical’ consumption, we might do better to 
recognise the forms of ethical concern always embedded in consumption practices. If 
‘ethical’ is taken, in a Foucauldian sense, to refer to the activity of constructing a life 
by negotiating practical choices about personal conduct, then the very basics of 
routine consumption – a concern for value for money, quality, and so on - can be 
understood to presuppose a set of specific learned ethical competencies. These 
competencies make up what one might call the habitual, practical dimensions of 
consumption practice (Hobson 2003). Daniel Miller’s ethnographic accounts of 
everyday consumption behaviours in North London (Miller 1998) illustrate the extent 
to which shopping is always laden with values, as a means of expressing concern and 
care for others. It has been argued that Miller’s work shows us “how far shopping is 
directed towards others, particularly family members, and how far it is guided by 
moral sentiments towards them and about how to live. Far from being individualistic, 
self-indulgent, and narcissistic, much shopping is based on relationships, indeed on 
love. It often involves considerable thoughtfulness about the particular desires and 
needs of others, though it may also reflect the aspirations which the shopper has for 
them, thereby functioning as a way of influencing them” (Sayer 2003, 353). Given 
this sense of the ordinary moral dimensions of shopping and other routine 
consumption practices, the emergence of ethical consumption as a field of marketing, 
campaigning, and policy-making can be understood in terms of the ways in which the 
practical moral dispositions of everyday consumption are re-articulated by policy-
makers, campaigning organisations, academics and businesses. Formal campaigns and 
policies of ethical consumption involve making the ethical dispositions already 
implicit in routine consumption the objects of explicit strategies of changing people’s 
sense of the scope and quality of their responsibilities.  
 
This same point also implies that certain sorts of consumption, and certain sorts of 
commodities, might lend themselves better to ethical consumption initiatives than 
others. This might depend on the degree to which particular commodities are 
embedded in everyday practices of care that enable the mobilisation of partial modes 
of concern to be re-articulated with more extended and expansive forms of concern. 
This section has argued that virtue ethics moves us beyond stringent models of 
universal rules or the sense that universal benevolence requires the abandonment of 
self-interest. This approach points towards the importance of finding ways of 
connecting up self-regarding concerns and other-regarding concerns, and with 
combining partiality and universality in creative ways. As Colin Campbell argues, 
“both self-interested and idealistic concerns are involved in consumerism” (1998, 
151-2). Consumption, therefore, cannot be simply divided into good and bad or 
condemned and extricated from our cultures to leave some untainted good. 
Summary: Ethical consumption and ordinary consumption 
Conventional discourses on ethical consumption tend to polarise arguments: fair trade 
conjures an unequivocally unfair trade; voluntary simplicity presupposes 
consumerism; vegetarianism problematises omnivory; veganism problematises 
vegetarianism; and in the broadest sense ethical consumption conjures unethical 
consumption. However, not all ‘free’ trade is necessarily unfair. Consumerism is 
always wrapped up with morality, as when someone buys a bigger car to take the 
elderly to church. Pork can be bought by a parent who believes they are doing their 
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best for their offspring, since beef was contaminated with BSE. It is the way that a 
simply defined ethical consumption creates pejorative dualities that we are 
questioning here. Social science research on consumption has found that much 
ordinary consumption is suffused with moral rhetoric and ethical concern. Much of 
the moralising is localised around family and friends, but can be seen as part of 
peoples’ self image, their integrity. Three important points follow from this. Firstly, 
without this ordinary ethics of consumption there would be no basis upon which to 
build an ethical consumption agenda. Secondly, to cast ordinary consumption as 
unequivocally unethical threatens to alienate ordinary people rather than recruit them. 
And thirdly, ethical consumption should refer to discussions that seek to refine 
consumption and non-consumption towards more broadly ethical practices. This is not 
to argue that all ordinary consumption is acceptable. Rather it is to recognise that the 




ETHICAL CONSUMPTION OR THE ETHICS OF 
CONSUMPTION?  
The preceding discussion of the pitfalls of moralizing in discussions of ethical 
consumption suggests that it might be useful to distinguish between two senses in 
which ethics and consumption can be related. On the one hand, there is a set of 
debates concerning the ‘ethics of consumption’, where what is at stake is a judgement 
concerning the morality of a whole system of provisioning, that of capitalist 
commodity production (see Crocker and Linden 1998). This is perhaps the dominant 
sense in discussions of environmental problems, debates about sustainable 
consumption, and in movements such as voluntary simplicity and the slow food 
movement. Here, it is ‘consumption’ itself that is the object of moral evaluation. The 
objective of these projects is the reduction of levels of aggregate consumption. 
On the other hand, ethical consumption also refers to a set of debates and strategies 
in which consumption is not so much the object of moral evaluation, but more a 
medium for moral and political action. This is the dominant sense in the case of 
consumer boycotts, ethical audits, corporate social responsibility initiatives, and fair 
trade campaigns. In these cases, there is no necessary implication that ‘ethical 
consumption’ implies less consumption, quite the reverse. Commodity consumption 
as a mode of provisioning is taken as given - assumed to be open to some 
transformation certainly - but not taken as the object of moral evaluation as such. 
Rather, the fact of commodity consumption as a means of social reproduction is 
understood as being a potential resource for changing other practices and patterns: 
consumption as voting.  
These two senses of ethics and consumption are not completely separate. Lots of 
ethical consumption campaigns are geared towards reducing overall levels of 
consumption. Others also play upon the standard desires and motivations of consumer 
behaviour, deploying the strategies of advertising, marketing, branding and so on. 
Many combine elements of both emphases. But the distinction is important to keep in 
focus for two reasons. Firstly, it raises questions about how these two distinct 
concerns – consumption as the object and the medium of moral action – are connected 
in different contexts. Secondly, it raises the question of just what are the moral and 
political issues most at stake in discussions of ethical consumption.  
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The moralization of consumption 
One recurring concern of those promoting ethical consumption is the worry that this 
set of practices is the reserve of a relatively privileged stratum of highly affluent 
consumers. The niche comprises those able to spend the time, energy, and money to 
buy organic, drink fair trade, and invest ethically. This sense of ethical consumption 
as a practice of social distinction, to use Pierre Bourdieu’s (1984) idea, is connected to 
the sense of ethical consumption being associated with highly moralistic forms of 
discourse. This moralistic stance extends to a great deal of academic, policy, and 
campaigning research and debate about consumption. There is a long tradition of 
criticizing mass commodity consumption as a means of criticizing much wider objects 
such as capitalism, modernity, the materialism of popular culture and planetary 
destruction.  
Danny Miller (1998) argues that the moralistic tone of so many debates about 
consumption is itself open to criticism. Miller’s argument is based on a particular 
philosophical position, one which is suspicious of the romanticised notions of 
authenticity that often underlie criticisms of consumption as a realm of social and 
cultural alienation. Miller holds to a philosophy of subject-object relations, according 
to which subjectivity and inter-subjectivity is always mediated by material objects. 
From this perspective, attention is focussed upon the symbolic meaning of material 
objects as mediators of social interaction. As we already noted, Miller has 
demonstrated in empirical depth the ways in which love and care are mediated by 
practices of commodity consumption. In the modern world, Miller argues, 
commodities become the mediums for objectifying and performing values and moral 
orders, perhaps most obviously through various forms of gift-giving. Consumption is 
a sphere in which people routinely negotiate moral dilemmas. As Robert Wilk 
observes, “consumption is in essence a moral matter, since it always and inevitably 
raises issues of fairness, self vs group interests, and immediate vs delayed 
gratification” (2001, 246).  
Miller’s argument is that, in a world of commodities, consumption per se is neither 
moral nor immoral, rather the key issue is whether “people appropriate this plethora 
of goods in order to enhance and not to detract from our devotion to other people” 
(1998,231). And Miller makes the provocative argument that ensuring this depends on 
the consumption of more, not less, industrially produced commodities. This runs 
counter to the general positions of recent movements around consumption, such as the 
voluntary simplicity movement, which hold that poverty is a product of particular 
modes of consumption (see Wilk, 2001, 257). Such movements do aim more directly 
at reducing consumption levels. 
Miller’s is very much a conception of consumption as a medium of ethical conduct. 
He is highly critical of traditions of thought and activism that see the ethics of 
consumption in terms of excess. These are guilty, he suggests, of adopting “an ascetic 
repudiation of the need for goods per se” (ibid., 241). Miller places poverty at the 
centre of the moral analysis of consumption, with surprising and provocative results. 
Poverty, he argues, is constituted by a lack of material resources. Arguments about 
over-consumption, which define the objectives of ethical consumption in terms of the 
reduction of overall levels of consumption, work against “an ethics based on the 
passionate desire to eliminate poverty. We live in a time when most human suffering 
is the direct result of the lack of goods. What most of humanity desperately needs is 
more consumption, more pharmaceuticals, more housing, more transport, more books, 
more computers” (Miller 2001, 227-8). The distinction between ethical consumption 
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and the ethics of consumption is, then, a key tension within the whole field of the 
ethics and politics of consumption. It draws sharply into focus the question of just 
what are the moral or ethical stakes in consumption, and in particular, whether it is 
possible to square different moral values such as freedom and sustainability, 
autonomy and responsibility.  
Questioning consumption 
Bernard Williams (1985) has argued that what he calls the ‘morality system’ has led 
to philosophers focussing on abstract models that narrowly define ethics in terms of a 
chain of relations between agency, obligations, and blame. His argument is that a 
focus on universal, often prescriptive understandings of moral action excludes from 
consideration factors that are not easily reduced to obligations, consequences, or 
rights. Following Williams’ argument, that the morality system is just one particular 
frame in which ethical concerns are interpreted, we might return to the observation 
that consumption has become increasingly politicized as an area of activity with a 
new critical agenda. As Robert Wilk (2001) suggests, the moralism that pervades 
discussions of consumption is itself worthy of study. The questions of who makes 
moral arguments about consumption, about how these arguments are deployed, and 
about what effects they have on different people, are important if we are to understand 
the complexities through which changing consumption patterns develop and evolve 
over time, and the ways in which interventions may be made into these processes.  
 
It is important to recognise that consumption is itself an arena through which people 
learn the meanings of what it is to act morally (Barnett and Cloke 2004). In this 
respect, the emphasis found in the work of Sen and Nussbaum on the role of material 
goods providing a means through which people are able to cultivate certain sorts of 
competencies and capacities, including those of caring for others and participating in 
public life, is valuable. It suggests that the ways in which ethics and consumption are 
related are much more complicated than simply quantifying the extent to which 
particular practices or products do or do not conform to a particular measure of 
‘ethicality’. This is not to undervalue the campaigns that develop accessible 
discourses to boycott the unethical or promote the ethical and rally collective action. 
Rather it is important to acknowledge both the intrinsic and instrumental value of 
involving ordinary people in the decisions and debates about what goals and 
objectives, rights and obligations should guide the ethical evaluation of consumption 
practices.  
Such debates, however, do not take place in a vacuum. As Cafaro argues (2001), 
affluent cultures are suffused with a discourse of individual self-interest and collective 
economic growth. Economics abstracts Adam Smith’s theory of the good flowing 
from self-interested action from its moral grounding to produce a mere multiplicity of 
consumer preferences. Economic growth results and is presented itself as a moral 
good. In this sense no one and no society need question its preferences. We have 
argued for the counter position. Much open debate, continuing discussion and some 
introspection about our ordinary consumption are valuable to prevent ossification into 




In this chapter, we have outlined some basic philosophical approaches to ethics that 
are relevant to the area of ethical consumption. These include deontological 
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approaches and consequentialist approaches, which focus on notions of obligation and 
on good outcomes, respectively. We have argued that such formalistic philosophical 
positions can be too demanding and abstract for application in everyday consumption. 
Consequentialism would presuppose the individuals’ capacity to make demanding and 
overly disinterested calculations about what action would produce the most desired 
aggregate outcomes. Deontology draws the consumer into a set of universal 
obligations whose development he or she need not be party to. These approaches are 
also too demanding in the sense that they imply stringent accounts of what is required 
to act ethically. Imagine how focused you would have to be on consequential 
calculations or rule following to be a comprehensive ethical consumer!  Being 
constrained to act within dictates or calculations also implies that something 
important about one’s own moral motivations would be lost. 
Nonethless, both of these theoretical traditions are an indispensable part of an applied 
ethical consumption:  
1). Consequentialist philosophies necessarily draw our attention to the 
outcomes of our consumer practices.  
2). Deontological philosophies cause us to generalise our consumer practices 
and therefore to think from the position of others. 
We have suggested that recent work in the area of virtue ethics is useful for 
approaching ethical consumption. This is because it focuses on a broader and more 
practical array of life’s considerations than either deontology or consequentialism. 
Virtue philosophy focuses us on flourishing, and living a good life is within our 
immediate grasp. Empirical evidence suggests that a sense of moral-integrity is more 
fundamental to the well-being of ethical consumers than either a concern for 
consequences or rules (though both of these are evident). Virtue theory implies a 
degree of partiality when having to decide between competing claims. This is a 
necessary introspection that we think cannot be avoided in ethical consumption. 
However, this flexibility and self-concern can lead to unwarranted ideas of superiority 
and inferiority. This tendency can be moderated, we argue, by acknowledging the 
forms of morality embedded in ordinary consumption practices. 
Thus, the mere application of consequentialist, deontological or virtue philosophies 
does not in itself unravel the conundrums of contemporary consumption. We have 
illustrated this with examples of the conflicting conclusions that might be drawn from 
applying them. This divergence of conclusions occurs not least because good 
consumption practices might have temporally limited applications; what is good one 
time might be detrimental another. Since a simple set of unchanging ethical consumer 
practices is neither possible nor desirable, we conclude that they must be formulated 
and reformulated in a continuous, open social debate. An important dimension of 
ethical consumption initiatives therefore becomes finding ways not just of enabling 
people to change their consumption practices, although that is important, but also of 
facilitating more widespread public participation in debates and decisions about the 
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